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I. INTRODUCTION
Cable television differs from conventional broadcast television
t Trustees' Professor of Administrative Law and Co-Director of the Applied Re-
search Center, William Mitchell College of Law. This Article benefited greatly from the
assistance of my research assistant, Anne Caulfield.
1
Hamilton: Implications for Economic Regulation of Cable Television
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
in a number of ways, from the method of transmission' to the
types of programming available.2 Cable can also deliver a variety
of services such as business data transmission, home security, medi-
cal alert, and energy management systems to its subscribers.
3
Cable's two-way communications capability clearly distinguishes
its services from those of conventional television.
As more advanced cable systems have developed, 4 many other
new technologies have emerged. These technologies provide serv-
ices quite similar to those offered by cable.5 As a result, cable
1. Conventional broadcast television "consists of free over-the-air VHF and UHF
television stations, including both advertiser-supported and public stations." J. LEVY & F.
SETZER, MEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION IN HOME VIDEO MARKETS 41 (December
23, 1982) (Staff Report of Office of Plans & Policy of the Federal Communications Com-
mission) [hereinafter cited as FCC Staff Report 1982]. Conventional television operates
on limited frequencies of the broadcast spectrum which are assigned and regulated by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). See D. GINSBERG, REGULATION OF
BROADCASTING 11, 14 (1979).
Cable television "consists of a well-placed television antenna . . . connected to the
sets of. . . subscribers" either by coaxial or fiber-optic cable. G. K. WEBB, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF CABLE TELEVISION 2 (1983). Coaxial cable consists of a copper wire encased in
plastic and aluminum. Id The cable uses electric currents to transmit signals. Id at 49.
Fiber optic cable is made from glass fibers and uses light to transmit signals. Fiber optic
cable does not corrode, is not affected by electrical storms and, perhaps most importantly,
has much more channel capacity than coaxial cable. Id Despite these advantages, fiber
optic cable is not yet widely used because of increased technological complexity and cost.
Id; see also D. GINSBERG, supra, at 341 (graphic representation of cable system).
2. Conventional television offers programming paid through advertiser or public
support. See FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 41.
Cable television offers enhanced reception of local signals, imported signals, pay
cable, and two-way capability. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 5-6, 11, 13-14. Pay cable
offers box office motion pictures and sports programming, in addition to other special
program selections. Id
3. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 13-14. Two way capability allows subscribers to
communicate with a computer located at the cable distribution center. These services
require a keyboard attached to the consumer's television set. Id at 2, 11, 13. For a discus-
sion of regulatory implications arising from cable's two-way capability, see Lloyd, Cable
Television s Emerging Two- Way Services. A Dilemma for Federal and State Regulators, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 1045 (1983).
4. See G. K. Webb, supra note 1, at 49. A coaxial cable and a fiber optic cable of the
same diameter can carry forty channels and one thousand channels respectively. Id.
Cable companies can also shift programming into different subscriber "tiers," in or-
der to charge different rates for specific channels. For example, the Minneapolis cable
system has four tiers, the first being free and the remaining tiers priced at $1.95, $8.45, and
$10.95 respectively. Rather than raising the price of a tier, the cable company can move
popular cable channels such as ESPN (sports programming) or the Black Entertainment
Network into higher-priced tiers. See Minneapoh Cable TV Firm Submits Changes in Prictg,
Minneapolis Star & Trib., Jan. 25, 1984, at 1B, col. 1.
5. These technologies include subscription television (STV), see generally ifra note
30; multipoint distribution service (MDS), see generally infra note 31; satellite master an-
tenna television (SMATV), see generally infra note 32; direct broadcast satellites (DBS), see
[Vol. 10
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television finds itself in an increasingly competitive marketplace, 6
yet subject to governmental regulations7 not shared by these
competitors.
Traditionally, cable systems have been subject to regulation be-
cause of their natural monopoly characteristics.8 Natural monop-
oly conditions exist where the entire demand in a market can be
satisfied at lowest cost by one producer. 9 For example, an electric
distribution company or local telephone company finds it progres-
sively cheaper to provide extra units of electricity or telephone
service. 10 Cable services enjoy the same economies of scale, that is,
the cost of production for the cable company decreases with each
generally infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text; and low power television (LPTV), see
generally thfia notes 60-64 and accompanying text. All of these technologies are capable of
delivering broadcast signals to individual subscribers.
6. Many authors and studies have concluded that cable systems exist in an increas-
ingly competitive market. The FCC recently noted the increasing competition in the com-
munications marketplace resulting from cable, MDS, DBS, LPTV, SMATV, and STV.
See Repeal of the "Regional Concentration of Control" Provisions of the Commission's
Multiple Ownership Rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2482-83 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 73) (proposed Jan. 20, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Ownership Rules]. The FCC has
stated that this increase in competition reduced the need for ownership restrictions in the
communications industry. See FCC proposes to end hmiting regional ownership of stations, Min-
neapolis Star & Trib., Jan. 14, 1984, at 12C, col. 1.
A study conducted in the Los Angeles area by the consulting firm of Browne, Bortz &
Coddington concluded that STV has significant difficulty penetrating areas already
served by cable. BROWNE, BARTZ & CODDINGTON, THE IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE Dis-
TRIBUTION TECHNOLOGIES ON CABLE TELEVISION 8 (March 1982) (Report prepared for
Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as NCTA REPORT].
Another industry analysis concluded that areas not cabled by 1986 might face compe-
tition from DBS systems. See DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENREITE SEC. CORP., INDUSTRY
VIEWPOINT 64 (1982) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT].
7. Cable systems are subject to regulation at the federal, state, and local level. See
Herbst, Matz & Gibbs, A Review ofFederal, State and Local Regulation of Cable Television in the
United States, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 377 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Herbst].
8. "Natural monopolies have historically been subject to regulation in order to se-
cure the advantages of size while preventing [the monopolist] from raising prices to levels
which exploit its monopoly position." F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 520 (1973).
9. See Hamilton & Hamilton, Duopoly in the Distribution ofElectricity: A Policy Failure,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 284 n.10 (1983). See generally 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION 119 (1971).
10. See R. SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 3-7 (1979).
Natural monopoly refers to a condition in which a firm has increasing returns to
scale for finite outputs, so that the firm's average cost of production decreases as
its production expands. When such a condition exists, a single company can
provide a product or service more efficiently than two competing firms can.
Note, The Federal Communications Commission And Interactive Cable Technology." The Casefor Mim-
imal Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 565, 568 (1983).
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new customer. " I
Regulation of cable has been premised on the existence of these
natural monopoly conditions and the concomitant monopoly
power which sometimes accompanies these conditions.' 2 Public
concern has focused on cable companies which, if unchecked,
could raise prices to monopoly levels and engage in other anticom-
petitive practices.' 3 Cable systems have, therefore, been subject to
regulation at the federal, 14 state, 15 and local 16 levels.
Competitive pressure from substitute technologies can keep the
prices charged by a natural monopoly near its costs.' 7 This com-
petitive pressure exists and is continuing to build in the communi-
cations industry.'8 Thus, the continued economic regulation of
cable television appears at best unnecessary and at worst detri-
11. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 63.
12. The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices
or exclude competition." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (quot-
ing United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)). Typically,
natural monopoly markets are regulated where only one firm supplies the market and that
firm has "dominance" in the relevant market. Although cable systems have the physical
characteristics of natural monopolies, few have dominance in their markets. See Note,
supra note 10, at 568-70.
13. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 179-80. Webb noted, however, that rather than
regulating the cable companies' monopoly power, many municipalities have simply used
that power to their own advantage in order to obtain municipal revenues. Id Another
anticompetitive practice frequently seen in the cable market is the territorial allocation of
markets. See, e.g., Affiliated Cable Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983)
(territorial market division of Houston by applicants for cable franchises).
14. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.1-.617, 78.1-.115 (1982); Herbst, supra note 7, at 378-96; see
also Noam, Federal and Stale Roles in Telecommunications. The Effects of Deregulation, VAND. L.
REV. 949 (1983) (new regulatory approach needed at state and federal level).
15. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 238.01-.35 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (Cable Communications
Act); 4 MINN. CODE AGENCY R. §§ 4.001-.231 (1982) (Rules of the Cable Communica-
tions Board); Donaldson, Minnesota's Approach to the Regulation of Cable Television, 10 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 413, 418 n.28 (1984) (survey of state cable television statutes).
16. See Herbst, supra note 7, at 407-11 (typical provisions in local franchise
agreements).
17. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 186 (1982) (competitive markets'
tendency to decentralize economic power).
18. See supra note 6. Many of the technologies that will compete with cable in the
future are not currently operational but will be within one or two years. See infra notes 59-
86 and accompanying text. One author has argued that cable will achieve dominance
because of its two-way capacity, its multiplicity of channels, its ability to charge fees for
viewing and its ability to narrowcast. See Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Mar-
ket. Overcoming The Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 F. CoMM. L.J. 209, 233-40 (1982).
Other technologies, however, offer many of these features. MDS and DBS offer many
channel selections; DBS in combination with a telephone offers two-way capability; DBS
has the ability to narrowcast; and virtually all technologies have the ability to monitor
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mental to the rapid and continuing technological developments in
this field.' 9
This Article explores the implications of the continued economic
regulation of cable television. Part II explains the market in which
cable operates and the degree to which substitutes check the mar-
ket power of cable. Part III offers recommendations for changes in
the current regulatory framework which will enable cable to con-
tinue competing in the rapidly changing communications
industry.
II. CONCENTRATION IN THE CABLE MARKET
A. Market Definition
I. Cross-Elasticity
To assess the market power of cable television, the market
boundaries for cable must be established. 20 Market boundaries
can be determined by observing the degree to which consumers
switch to substitute products in response to price increases for
cable services. 2' This behavior, as measured by the cross-elasticity
of demand, is the preferred method for determining market
boundaries.
22
To properly measure cross-elasticity, information on the prices
charged by several companies over a long period of time must be
available.2 3 In the case of video programming, no such data is
available for two reasons. First, audiences do not pay to receive
conventional television broadcasting, 24 which is perhaps the most
19. Se infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
20. See FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 34; P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALY-
SIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES $ 231 (3d ed. 1981).
21. See P. AREEDA, supra note 20, at 230. "The market power of a firm . . .is
limited by the availability of substitutes to which consumers can switch if the firm raises
prices above competitive levels or gives inferior service." FCC Staff Report 1982, supra
note 1, at 34-35. Substitution can occur in two ways: through the consumer moving to an
alternative product or through shifts in production capacity of firms in the industry. Id at
35.
22. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 519a (1978).
23. See FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 37.
24. Id The FCC did note that consumers pay indirectly for advertiser-supported
programming:
Consumers may pay indirectly for the programming they receive through higher
prices for advertized products, though whether total advertising expenditures
would fall in the absence of television is unclear. In any event, no positive price
is associated with receipt of a specific advertiser-supported signal, so that price
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evident substitute for cable. Second, many of the technologies
competing with cable are new and in-depth substitutability data is
unavailable. Thus, the determination of which technologies are
actual competitors of cable must rest on reasoned estimation
rather than on rigorous scientific proof.
2. Reasonab j Interchangeable Products
The United States Supreme Court considers two products to be
in the same market if they are "reasonably interchangeable. '2 5 In
making this determination, the Supreme Court considers both the
product and the geographic dimensions of the market involved. 26
Unfortunately, these tools prove problematic in evaluating the
cable market.
a. Product Dimension
From the consumer's viewpoint, the product offered by cable is
principally video programming, usually for entertainment pur-
poses.2 7 For conventional television advertisers, the market is
viewed quite differently. With subscription services, the product is
programming;28 in the case of conventional television, the product
for sale is audiences for advertising messages.2 9 These differing
viewpoints make measurement of the substitutability between
cable and conventional television difficult. Measuring the sub-
stitutability between most of cable's competitors poses the same
difficulty.
Subscription video services include cable television, subscription
television 30 (STV), multipoint distribution service31 (MDS), and
25. See United States v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
26. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 22, at 517.
27. See FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 39.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. STV systems, like pay cable, provide special programming to subscribers who pay
a fee for the service. STV signals are transmitted over the air to the subscriber's home
with UHF or VHF signals from a locally based antenna. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION:
THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 302 (Comm.
Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT). The signal is scrambled to limit recep-
tion to those who pay for the service. Subscribers receive a decoder which they attach to
their televisions. Id STV operates on a specified frequency and therefore, has only one
channel to program. Id at 302-03.
The House Staff Subcommittee Report noted the growing popularity of STV:
The number of subscribers to STV systems more than doubled in 1980, from an
[Vol. 10
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satellite master antenna television 32 (SMATV). In the near future,
direct broadcast satellites33 (DBS) and low power television sta-
tions34 (LPTV) will be available.3 5 Video cassette recorders
estimated 399,000 at the beginning of the year to approximately 825,000 at the
year's end. However, this still represents only about one percent of U.S. house-
holds. Nationwide, there are only 24 operating STV systems in a total of 23
cities. One station, ON-TV in Los Angeles, had approximately 44 percent of the
industry's subscribers (360,000); the next largest, Wometco in New York, had
about 100,000 subscribers; and three other systems had over 50,000 subscribers.
Estimated total revenues for the STV industry in 1980 varied from $143 million
to $192 million. These revenues resulted from service charges to subscribers of
about $20 per month, in addition to installation fees for new subscribers.
Id at 303; see also G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 18-19; INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6,
at 53-57; NCTA REPORT, supra note 6, at vii (discussing STV and impact on cable
market).
31. MDS is transmitted through microwaves and can only be received within con-
fined geographical areas. MDS serves as a common carrier from which programmers lease
time. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 304. MDS has a limited range of transmission and
the installation of the special receiving antenna is expensive. Therefore, MDS is used
primarily to serve multi-unit structures such as hotels and apartment buildings which can
easily distribute costs among residents. Id., set G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 17. MDS
operators often broadcast scrambled signals, similar to STV, to prevent unauthorized re-
ception. Id Microwaves require a direct line of sight transmission. They can be easily
deflected, thus limiting the suitability of MDS for individual subscribers. Id at 17-18.
MDS subscriptions in 1980 were estimated at 400,000, with revenues of $58 million.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 304. 1.4 million subscribers and revenues of $331 million
are forecast for 1985. Id. The FCC currently permits MDS to provide only two channels.
The MDS transmission band could, however, easily be expanded to twenty or thirty chan-
nels. Smith, The Birth of a Wired Nation in TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT 8 (1982). In an urban area it takes $30 million to $100 million to install cable; MDS
can be placed in the same location for only $100,000. Id Furthermore, MDS is regulated
only at the federal level. Local franchising procedures thus have no impact on MDS
service. Id; see also INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 58-61 (discussion of MDS).
32. SMATV systems use an earth station to receive satellite signals which are then
primarily delivered by wire to multi-unit structures such as hotels and apartment com-
plexes. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 43. SMATV operators can provide as
many channels as cable operators. SMATV systems deliver programming generated by
pay network superstations and advertiser-supported conventional TV stations. INDUSTRY
VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 61. "About 500,000 homes are passed by SMATV systems
today and there are about 150,000 customers, indicating a somewhat lower penetration
rate than cable achieves." Id In 1983, the City of Chicago revoked permits obtained by
Cablecom Corp., an SMATV company, to erect microwave dishes on twenty-five
lakefront high rises. The city claimed the permits were issued incorrectly, denying that
they were revoked because of the competitive threat SMATV posed to the cable franchise
being negotiated by the city. City pulls permit plug on 'dish' TVoperators, Chicago Trib., Dec.
4, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
In November 1983, the FCC ruled that SMATV systems could not be regulated by
state or local authorities. See Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., FCC 83-526 (released
Nov. 17, 1983); infa note 50. SMATV systems thus escape the regulatory burdens im-
posed by states and by local franchise agreements. See infra note 50 and accompanying
text (discussion of substitutability between cable and SMATV).
33. For a description of DBS service, see infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
34. For a description of LPTV service, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
19841
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(VCRs) and video discs also provide services similar to those of-
fered by cable. 36 A still broader market definition would include
radio, telephone, records, movie theaters, live theater, live sports
events, newspapers, books, and magazines as additional sources of
consumer information and entertainment.3 7
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce noted in a
1982 report on the cable television industry that, "[d]istinctions
between products and services, prices, units of measurements,
types of costs and expenses, and other variables are difficult to
make an [sic] are often subject to considerable discretion. In com-
munications, products compete with services, and prices may be
bundled. ' 38 Thus, a precise determination of which products are
"reasonably interchangeable" with cable proves difficult. Further
problems arise in attempting to define the geographic dimension
of the cable market.
b. Geographic Dimension
Although the geographic boundaries of a cable system are easily
defined, 39 territorial boundaries for conventional television are far
from clear.4° Transmitters have varying frequencies and power
35. In September 1983, the FCC approved another type of satellite-to-home TV serv-
ice. This service is called a "quasi" or low-power satellite-to-home system which differs
from the high-power systems approved by the FCC in 1982. The primary difference is the
type of antenna needed to receive the satellite's signals. With a high-power satellite, an
antenna two feet in diameter can be used to receive signals. With the low-power system,
an antenna roughly four feet in diameter is needed. The new low-power system is targeted
at rural areas, where the larger antenna is not a drawback. The FCC determined that the
new system would not be classified as a "broadcaster" for regulatory purposes. Satellie-to-
home TV service gets clearance, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Sept. 12, 1983, at 3B, col. 5.
36. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 21-22. Depending upon the consumer's geo-
graphic area, the purchaser of a VCR or videodisc has access to unlimited material. FCC
Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 44.
The services provided by VCRs and video disc players do differ from those of
over-the-air and cable delivery media. VCRs and disc players display prer-
ecorded material rather than real-time signals, and so may be less satisfactory
than other media for presentation of news or sports, where viewers may consider
instantaneous delivery important.
Id By 1980, an estimated 1.4 million VCRs had been sold to U.S. consumers. STAFF
REPORT, supra note 30, at 305. Estimates are that by 1985 there will be 5.3 million VCR
users in the U.S. Id
37. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 41-42.
38. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 48.
39. "[C]able reception is limited to the geographic areas where cable systems have
been installed." FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 53.
40. See K. GRODON, J. LEVY & R. PREECE, FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP 20-
21 (November 1981) (Staff Report by FCC Office of Plans and Policy) [hereinafter cited
as FCC Staff Report 1981].
[Vol. 10
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levels; thus the coverage areas of different stations can vary greatly
within a single metropolitan area.4' Other technologies in the
communications field also have boundaries which are not easily
defined.
Nevertheless, in 1982 the Federal Communications Commis-
sion's (FCC) Office of Plans and Policy concluded that the geo-
graphic market for video products was local rather than
national. 42 According to the Report, "[t]he range of choices avail-
able to viewers depends on the number of outlets available at the
local level." '43  Thus, the fact that a cable operator owns a
franchise in a city that is five hundred miles away from the market
under consideration should have no effect on the level of competi-
tiveness in that market.4
B. Substitutability
Despite the difficulties in assessing the substitutability among
cable and its competitors, several studies which address this issue
have been conducted. The House Committee on Energy and
Commerce4 5 and the FCC Office of Plans and Policy 46 have both
compiled extensive market studies on the substitutability between
cable television and conventional television,
47 STV,48 MDS, 49
41. Id at 21. "[T]he coverage of different stations will never be identical, nor will the
coverage area of any station necessarily correspond to the cable service area." Id at 21.
42. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 14, at 6. "[T]he national programming deliv-
ery market is nothing more than a collection of local markets." Id
43. Id at 5.
44. The FCC has recently acknowledged this fact. Currently, under title 47 of the
Code of Federal Regulations, a party may not own or control three commercial AM, FM
or TV stations where there is primary service contour overlap or where any two stations
are within one hundred miles of the third. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(b)(1), 73.240(a)(2),
73.636(a)(2) (1982).
In January 1984, on a petition from the National Association of Broadcasters, the
FCC proposed the repeal of these rules. See Ownership Rules, supra note 6, at 2478. The
FCC noted its recent refusal to adopt multiple ownership rules for cable television, LPTV,
and DBS services. Id at 2481.
45. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30.
46. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1; FCC Staff Report 1981, supra note 40. The
FCC reports were compiled to assist the FCC in its review of cable and other media own-
ership rules. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 1; FCC Staff Report 1981,supra note
40, at 1. The House Staff Report was prepared to assist Congress in determining when to
regulate or deregulate the communications industry. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at
Xiii.
47. The House of Representatives Telecommunications Subcommittee was not opti-
mistic about cable's ability to overtake conventional television. Data submitted to the
House Staff indicated that in 1979, for the counties containing the twenty-five largest
metropolitan areas, cable penetrated only eight percent of the homes, a figure that had
19841
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risen to thirteen percent by 1981. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 348. "Cable penetra-
tion measures the total number of television households in a market opting to receive
cable service as a percentage of all television households in the market." Id at 349. Coun-
ties of at least 150,000 in population, accounting for another thirty percent of all house-
holds, had a cable penetration figure of nineteen percent, a figure that rose to twenty-nine
percent in 1981. Id at 348. These figures appear quite low when compared with the
ninety-eight percent of the nation's households that own television sets. Id at 349.
Only limited data is available which quantifies the cross-elasticity between conven-
tional television and cable television. Substantial data does exist, however, on the impact
cable television has had on the audience share of traditional broadcast television in mar-
kets where the two coexist. The FCC 1980 CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules
concluded that, even if every household in the top one hundred markets had access to
cable, less than forty percent of all households in those markets would actually subscribe
to cable. In re Cable Television Syndicated Programming Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d
663, 685 (1980). The FCC premised its determination on the assumption that in these
markets, the demand for cable would be less than the demand in less populous, outlying
areas, due to the greater number of signals available in the larger markets, and the re-
duced need for enhanced reception. Thus, the FCC concluded that future cable penetra-
tion would not exceed forty-eight percent. Id at 684-87; see also FCC Staff Report 1982,
supra note 1, at 38; Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 77, 111, 117 (1981) (analyzing impact of cable on conventional television).
48. In 1981, the FCC indicated that STV could compete with cable for those consum-
ers who wanted at most one additional channel. FCC Staff Report 1981, supra note 40, at
65. The House Committee noted, however, that STV accounts for less than one percent of
all television households. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 25. In 1981, STV was avail-
able in only seventeen markets. Id., see also G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 18-19 (discussing
market position of STV).
One empirical study has researched substitution between cable and STV. NCTA
REPORT, supra note 6. The Report focused on the relative demand for cable and STV in
two Los Angeles franchises. Id. at 1. The study revealed that STV attracted a relatively
large number of subscribers even where cable television was available. Id at 8. This
result was partly attributable to STV's arrival as the first subscription service in those
areas, and to an aggressive advertising effort by the STV stations. Id at 6, 8. The survey
data indicated that STV had difficulty penetrating areas where cable television was avail-
able prior to the entrance of the STV station. Conversely, STV did well in non-cabled
areas and appeared to retain a significant share of its subscribers even when the area was
finally cabled. Id. at 8. The NCTA Report expected that when STV was the first sub-
scription service to arrive in an area, fifty percent of its subscribers would switch to cable
when cable arrived; in Los Angeles, however, only fifteen percent did switch. In general
terms, if cable could normally expect a fifty to fifty-five percent penetration rate in a given
area, STV, established first, could retain more than one-third of the potential market.
INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 54.
49. Like STV, MDS accounts for less than one percent of all television households.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 25. Nonetheless, MDS systems can be set up in a matter
of months, compared to cable systems which can take several years to complete. Techno-
logical advances have resulted in MDS antennae selling for as little as $100, making MDS
more affordable. INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 59.
A local newspaper looked at the impact of MDS in the Twin Cities market. Clark,
Pressures Cut Into Growth of Cable TV, St. Paul Pioneer Press/Dispatch, Mar. 7, 1983, at B1,
col. 1. TVQ, the local supplier of MDS, reduced its monthly subscription rates to apart-
ment dwellers from $16.95 to $7.50. Twin Cities cable operators admitted that the price
change hurt their businesses. The article also reported that the advent of SMATV in the
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SMATV, 50 VCRs and video discs, 5' as well as other sources of con-
sumer information and entertainment. 52 Their reports evaluated
southwestern suburbs halted cable penetration into large apartment complexes. Id at B6,
col. 2.
The Microband Corporation of America recently urged the FCC to increase MDS
channel capacity by switching the frequency assignments of a portion of the spectrum
allocated to private and governmental institutions. Currently, these frequencies are
largely unused. INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 59. Microband has proposed mul-
tiple channeled MDS systems, of five to eight channels under common control. Id These
changes will substantially increase the level of competition between MDS and cable.
The NCTA Report concluded that a multichannel MDS system could be serious
competition for cable. Evidence suggested that most or all of a consumer's multichannel
demand could be met by a four or five channel service. NCTA REPORT, supra note 6, at
34. The NCTA Report's analysis of data taken from the pay television census demon-
strated strong evidence of diminishing incremental demand with increasing premium
channels. Id at 29. The data suggested that per subscriber revenues are maximized when
four or five premium channels are made available. Id at 31. Nonetheless, the NCTA
Report still concluded that cable has an advantage if it can offer a fifty channel package
at the same price as a five channel MDS system. Id at 36. At that point it would be up to
the MDS operator to reduce the rate of his service by the marginal value of the forty-five
other channels. Id at 6. The NCTA Report estimated that competing multichannel tech-
nologies have the potential of reducing cable penetration by five to twenty percentage
points. Id at 36.
50. For the businessman, SMATV offers the advantage of low start-up costs and few
regulatory constraints. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 15. For subscribers, however, the
$5,000 cost of the receiving antenna is prohibitive, limiting SMATV's appeal to multi-unit
structures such as hotels and apartment complexes. Id; see also INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT,
supra note 6, at 62.
SMATV operators have proposed a sixty channel system linking a number of build-
ings together by microwave, with a central earth station to form an extensive SMATV
system. Given the high cost of cable in urban areas, this method may be a cost effective
alternative to conventional cable. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 15. The FCC decided in
early November that FCC rules preempted local and state regulation of private cable
systems such as SMATV. See Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., FCC 83-526 (released
Nov. 17, 1983). The FCC held that "private cable systems are part of a national commu-
nications network, subject to federal regulation only." Tauber & Costlow, FCCPreemption
Serves as Watershedfor tivate Cable, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 6, 1984, at 14. Preemption will
allow private cable operators to compete vigorously in the home video market. Id
51. The FCC's 1982 Report supported a finding of competition between cable and
VCRs. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 46. It noted that the $650 purchase price
of a VCR would be equivalent to a monthly fee of $8.01, assuming a lifetime often years
and an interest rate often percent. The cost of cassette rental would be additional. Video
disc players are considerably less expensive than VCRs but cannot record material off the
air. The FCC believed that while the average per channel cost appears to be lower for
cable, the comparable prices suggested that VCRs would be close substitutes for cable. Id
The House Committee had a different view of the situation. It stated that video
players were too expensive and had not been purchased in sufficient numbers to make
inroads into the video market. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 25. One author, Eli
Noam, has concurred in this assessment. He noted that the availability of movie cassettes,
has not significantly reduced television viewing. See Noam, supra note 18, at 240.
52. The FCC's 1982 Report found that some nonvideo sources of entertainment and
information provide substitutes for video services. For example, AM and FM radio can
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all currently available data to assess the potential impact of each
on the cable services market.
53
C Conclusion on Current Market Participants
The House Committee found that the existing video market
consisted of conventional television, cable, movie theaters, STV,
MDS, video cassettes, and discs. It also found that a separate au-
dio market existed, consisting of radio, phonograph records, and
tapes. It admitted that its market definitions were largely based
on the similarities in the method of receiving video information
transmitted through different conduits.
54
The FCC had a much more expansive notion of market partici-
pants and substitutability. With regard to the various video alter-
natives, the FCC Report suggested that the video alternatives are
very similar products with prices demonstrating that subscription
video services are close substitutes for conventional television for a
large segment of the population. 55 According to the FCC, al-
though the services of VCRs, video discs, and motion picture thea-
provide news and information like conventional television. For entertainment, radio pro-
vides a different function than television, though it does compete for audience attention.
FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 48.
"The [national] print media offer another imperfect substitute for home video serv-
ices. Newspapers provide a major source of political information and opinion. While they
cannot provide instantaneous information such as disaster reports and traffic alerts, they
can provide much more detailed information and analysis." Id at 49. In its newspaper-
television ownership proceedings, the FCC also noted its determination that "newspapers
and television stations in the same community operated in the same market." Id In
addition, "[t]he distinction between the electronic and print media will be blurred by the
advent of teletext and videotext, which will take advantage of unused portions of the
television signal to deliver textual information on the television screen." Id
Furthermore, "[e]mpirical evidence from the Roper organization poll suggests that
the various media are substitutes in the provision of news. In 1981, when asked to list
primary news sources, 64 percent of those surveyed listed television, 18 percent listed ra-
dio, and 44 percent listed newspapers." Id This information implies that many people
actually use more than one medium as a news source. Id
The Report noted other nonvideo services which compete with video programming:
Live performances, including live theater, concerts, night club acts, and live
sporting events, provide yet another substitute for home video services. While
they do not occur in the home, they provide similar cultural and entertainment
services and provide alternative uses of a viewer's leisure time. The fact that
professional sports events are frequently blacked out on television in the market
in which they occur reflects the sports interests' recognition of the substitutability
of live and broadcast performances.
Id at 50.
53. Local telephone companies may also have an impact on cable television markets.
See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
54. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 22.
55. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 51.
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ters appear less similar to conventional television than subscription
television, both services and prices are similar enough to deserve
attention in any market assessment. The FCC concluded that
nonvideo services are substitutable in some ways but not others.56
The FCC believed that the existence of even imperfect substitutes
for a firm's product can have a major effect on the firm's behavior.
By reducing the market for a product by only a small percentage,
nonvideo services reduce other firms' profits and create incentives
to change prices or service characteristics. 57 The FCC concluded
that "[d]efining the market narrowly as consisting only of home
video services, and excluding the audio, print, live, and other me-
dia, will cause measures of concentration to underestimate drasti-
cally competition for audience's attention."58
D. Future Market Participants
A final dimension of the cable market must be considered-that
of time. Although the time dimension is usually overlooked in a
market analysis, it has particular importance in the area of com-
munications. A market which presently appears limited in a
number of product alternatives will become increasingly competi-
tive over time. 59 The prospects for new and developing technolo-
gies that will provide added competition for cable are favorable.
The possibility of increased channel capacity for STV and MDS
may cause those video services to become more cross-elastic with
cable. In addition, there are two new video services on the hori-
zon, low power television (LPTV) and direct broadcast satellites
(DBS), that will add to the marketplace of information technolo-
gies. Potential competition from the recently divested Bell Oper-
ating Companies (BOCs) raises additional questions regarding the
communications marketplace.
1. Low Power Television
The FCC has proposed a system of LPTV stations that would
add significantly to the number of conventional television out-
lets. 6° Broadcasting with less power than a conventional television
56. Id at 52.
57. Id at 53.
58. Id
59. FCC Staff Report 1981, supra note 40, at 20.
60. Id at 25. A 1978 FCC Task Force estimated that the cost of creating a LPTV
station would be roughly $55,000. Smith, supra note 38, at 8. In September 1983 the FCC
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station over previously unassigned VHF and UHF channels,
LPTV will provide signals to small geographic areas. 6' The ad-
vantages of LPTV include lower start-up costs and fewer regula-
tory responsibilities than a conventional broadcast station.
62
One commentator has pointed out that before 1981, four thou-
sand LPTV stations were already operating as television transla-
tors around the country. Translators are stations used as relays to
extend the broadcast area of a conventional television station. As
more LPTV stations are licensed, cable will face more competition
from over-the-air broadcasting. 63 Many applicants for LPTV
licenses also propose to construct STV stations. This increase in
pay television stations will also provide competition for local cable
operators.64
2. Direct Broadcast Satellites
Direct Broadcast Satellites have two distinguishing characteris-
tics. The transponders, devices that amplify the signals from earth
and send them back to earth, are substantially more powerful and
operate at higher frequencies than SMATV. 65 The power of these
transponders will make it possible to beam a signal strong enough
to be received by a small home station on earth.66 These home
stations could be built for as little as $300.67
A 1981 report by the FCC noted that DBS could offer a strong
alternative to cable because DBS can furnish more than one chan-
nel of programming. 6a This capability will spread the fixed costs
of hook-up over a larger quantity of products. In addition, the
purchase price will be relatively low. 69 The House Committee Re-
port recognized the competitive potential of DBS, but argued that
there was no guarantee that DBS would increase the number of
available video outlets, because no system was currently
awarded twenty-three licenses for LPTV stations in sixteen states. See FCC lottery awards 23
low-power, lunited-range TV licenses, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Sept. 30, 1983, at 8C, col. 2.
61. FCC Staff Report, supra note 40, at 43.
62. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 19-20. Start-up costs may be as low as $20,000
compared to the approximation of $2 million for the start-up cost of a full-power station.
Id.
63. Id at 18.
64. Id at 19-20.
65. FCC Staff Report 1982, supra note 1, at 43.
66. Id
67. Id
68. FCC Staff Report 1981, supra note 40, at 23.
69. INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 65.
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operational.
70
Most analysts predict that DBS systems will be a billion dollar
market with three to five million subscribers by 1990. 7 1 Thus DBS
appears to enjoy great potential substitutability with cable
services.
3. Telephone
Perhaps the most significant prospect for change in the cable
industry stems from potential competition from local telephone
companies. Beyond legal restrictions, which are currently being
lifted,72 cable and telephone systems are extremely different in
their technical capability.7 3 The telephone wire in an average
home has about one-thousandth of the information carrying ca-
pacity of the typical cable wire. Telephone lines are designed to
transmit speech while cable wires can carry multiple and broad-
band signals. 74 A telephone system, however, is connected by a
switched network, meaning that every point on the system can be
connected with every other point on the system. 75 Obviously, this
type of network is much more complicated than a cable system
which sends television signals down a main trunk line and into
subscribers' homes.
76
Replacing the entire cable network with a switched network
might be completely impractical and infeasible; substituting a tele-
phone wire with a wire that has more information carrying capac-
ity is not. 77 Telephone companies clearly have the capability to
70. STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 385.
71. INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, supra note 6, at 63-65.
72. Under the 1956 consent decree, AT&T was precluded from engaging in any busi-
ness other than telecommunications. Under the terms of the Modified Final Judgment
(MFJ) the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) are permitted to engage in any business
they desire, with court consent. The court must determine whether a BOG would have an
unfair advantage in the market it seeks to enter. Although provision of cable services by
the BOCs is not specifically authorized by the MFJ, a BOG could petition the court to
provide this service; BOCs can provide their customers with video capability where neces-
sary, without court approval. Similarly, the BOCs can provide the transmission vehicle
for cable if the local cable franchisee requests this service. Telephone conference with
John Walker, Manager-Information, and Greg Ludvigsen, Attorney, Northwestern Bell
(Feb. 21, 1984).
73. F. WILLIAMS, THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION 57 (1982).
74. Id "Broadband" is a high capacity communications channel that can carry more
than a voice signal. Id For example, one television channel on a cable could carry six
hundred phone conversations. Id
75. Id
76. Id at 57-58.
77. Id. at 58.
19841
15
Hamilton: Implications for Economic Regulation of Cable Television
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
lay and operate fiber optic cable to increase their ability to trans-
mit signals. 78 The question thus becomes one of economics and
philosophy rather than technology. 79
The distribution system for basic telephone service and cable is
a natural monopoly.80 If cable and telephone systems offer the
same services in a natural monopoly market, one will eventually
succeed in driving the other out of the market.8 1 Thus, from a
public policy standpoint a single line supplier would appear to be
the best alternative.8 2 Legislation and regulations at all levels of
government, however, have discouraged the combination of cable,
telephone, and other wire services into a single monopoly firm. 3
Competition between cable and telephone is already beginning
to develop as customers seeking to bypass the traditional telephone
system have turned to cable networks .84 In the next few months,
78. Smith, supra note 31, at 12.
79. Id
80. See Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 9, at 285 (1983). Natural monopoly condi-
tions exist where one producer is the lowest cost method of supply in the long run. Id at
285 n. 10. This situation arises where services are being distributed along networks from a
relatively small number of points to a relatively large number of points. Id at 285; see also
S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 291-92 (local telephone service is a natural monopoly).
The possibility also exists that utility companies, such as electrical companies, will
ultimately use fiber optic cable. At that point, an electric utility could provide the same
home video or communications services as cable. See Hays, Fiber Optics: Thetfuure is now,
ELECTRICAL WORLD, Feb. 1984, at 51.
81. Hamilton &.Hamilton, supra note 9, at 285.
82. Id at 284. The costs of duplicate service will almost certainly outweigh the bene-
fits which result from duplication. Id at 284-85. The problem then becomes regulating
the natural monopoly aspect of the service provided and allowing the remainder of the
market to be unregulated. The problem of joint cost allocation between intrastate and
interstate phone service has already been tackled in the divestiture of the Bell Operating
Companies from AT&T. See S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 285-87, 314. This experience
could prove very instructive in trying to accomplish a similar cost allocation for a cable or
telephone system that provides both telephone and cable services.
Mr. Gene Bier, Chief Executive Officer of Northwestern Bell, indicated in a recent
newspaper interview that he believed local service should remain regulated, while the
remainder of services provided by Northwestern Bell should be unregulated. In other
words, Bier favored competition to the greatest extent possible. See Cariedo, Bell chiefsays
market should set phone rates, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Feb. 27, 1984, at IJ, 8J, cols. 1-2.
83. G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 166.
84. "Telephone bypass" refers to the actions being taken by many large corporations
to set up their own local telephone networks. Arieff, Debate Builds Over 'Telephone Bypass,
LEGAL TIMES, July 11, 1983, at 1. The primary reason for this activity is cost. Although
business service is priced at marginal cost, the access charge which is assessed per line
makes it economical for large users to install their own systems. See Northwestern Bell
Interim Tariff § 33 (effective Nov. 28, 1983) (especially true for Centrex users who pay per
line, rather than PBX users who pay per trunk).
Westinghouse Electric, Citicorp, General Electric, and Arco are just a few of the
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states must decide how to operate in the new communications en-
vironment created by the FCC and Judge Harold Greene in the
AT&T divestiture.8 5 Clearly, at the federal level, the theme is de-
regulation and increased competition.8 6 Whether states will adopt
this theme remains to be seen.
III. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF A COMPETITIVE
VIDEO MARKET
As the discussion in Part II illustrates, considerable cross elastic-
ity of demand exists among cable service, conventional television,
and the developing technologies in the communications industry.
Despite the number of apparent substitutes for cable, state and
local governments have chosen to regulate cable systems through-
out the country. Regulation has been the response to the per-
ceived market failures of cable, which stem from the natural
monopoly characteristics of the individual cable systems .
7
A variety of regulatory approaches have been used to regulate
cable; these forms of regulation principally have included rate reg-
ulation, franchise fees and access requirements, and franchising
procedures. In most situations a combination of these methods is
used. A brief description of each follows.
A. Regulatog Methods
L Rate Regulation
Three principal methods of rate regulation are used by public
utility commissions: cost of capital, rate of return, and operating
ratio. 8 The cost of capital method sets a total dollar figure that
larger businesses which have begun establishing private communications networks. Arieff,
supra, at 4, col. 1.
Local phone companies and public utilities commissions have, however, already
taken steps to prevent cable television companies from offering telephone services. Id In
Nebraska, Oregon, and New Mexico the BOCs have challenged efforts by cable compa-
nies to bypass the local phone exchanges in delivering high speed data transmissions to
businesses. Id
In Minnesota, if a cable company provides two-way voice communications it will be
regulated as a telephone company. See Minnesota Microwave, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n., 291 Minn. 241, 248, 100 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1971); MINN. STAT. §§ 237.01-.47
(1982).
85. Bryson & Danner, States Uneasy Partners 'n Communications Revolution, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 29, 1983, at 12, col. 1; see also Hoffman, State Regulatory Problems, 10 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 489 (1984).
86. Byrson & Danner, supra note 85, at 12.
87. See S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 15.
88. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 7.03 [2][a]-[c] (1983).
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should cover both financial and operating costs. 89 The rate of re-
turn method is most often used in utility ratemaking. This method
fixes a percentage rate of return on investment plus operating
costs.9° Finally, the operating ratio is established by determining
operating costs and then adding a fixed percentage to cover
financial costs. 91
2. Franchise Fees and Access Requirements
The FCC has determined that municipal authorities may
charge a maximum of five percent of gross revenues as an initial
franchise fee.92 Notwithstanding this express limitation, munici-
palities have successfully circumvented the intent of the FCC.
Some cities have negotiated lump sum cash payments from fran-
chisees while others have required extensive investment in public
facilities. Other municipalities receive payment in the form of free
use of the cable company's equipment. 93
In addition, local cable companies may be subject to a variety of
access requirements. 94 These access requirements are typically
contained in the franchise agreement. Many municipalities re-
quire the cable company to provide channels for specified pur-
poses, such as local government programming, local educational
programming, and leased access channels.95
3. Franchise Procedures
The most pervasive control over the development of cable televi-
89. Id § 7 .03[2][a].
90. Id § 7.03[2][b].
91. Id § 7 .03[2][c].
92. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982). The regulation provides that:
Franchise fees shall be no more that 3 percent of the franchisee's gross revenues
per year from all cable services in the community (including all forms of consid-
eration, such as initial lump sum payments). If the franchise fee is in the range
of 3 to 5 percent of such revenues, the fee shall be approved by the Commission if
reasonable upon showings: (a) By the franchisee, that it will not interfere with
the effectuation of federal regulatory goals in the field of cable television, and (b)
by the franchising authority, that it is appropriate in light of the planned local
regulatory program. With respect to a system community unit that was
franchised or in operation prior to March 31, 1972, the provisions of this para-
graph shall not be effective until the end of the system's current franchise period,
or until 15 years from the date of initial grant of the franchise, whichever occurs
first.
Id.
93. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 39, 175, 179.
94. See Herbst, supra note 7, at 390, 409; Donaldson, Minnesota's Approach to the Regula-
tion of Cable Television, 10 WM MITCHELL L. REV. 413, 425-26 (1984).
95. Herbst, supra note 7, at 409.
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sion results from the municipal franchise agreements which com-
pany owners must negotiate with municipal authorities. Local
franchise ordinances and contracts vary greatly, 96 although a typi-
cal franchise agreement will contain provisions regarding initial
service and programming, local programming, access require-
ments, rates, and rate change procedures. Once granted, the
franchise contract becomes the controlling document for determin-
ing the respective rights and obligations of the municipality and
the franchisee.
B. Anayszs
1. Drawbacks of Regulatt'on
The methods of regulation typically applied to cable systems
may have significant drawbacks for the efficient operation of a
cable system. These regulatory tools become even more disabling
if the cable industry is competitive rather than monopolistic.
Given the increased competitiveness in the cable market, regula-
tion may impose discriminatory obligations on cable not shared by
its competitors, and thus inhibit both its growth and the conse-
quent consumer welfare.
In addition to the specific problems for each particular form of
cable regulation, any regulatory system contains inherent defects,
suggesting that a cautionary approach be taken. As one author
has noted, regardless of the problems surrounding the unregulated
status quo, the problems surrounding a regulatory scheme will also
prove difficult. 97 "Before advocating the use of regulation, one
must be quite clear that the unregulated market possesses serious
96. Id at 407-08.
97. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 184. In addition to the drawbacks inherent in any
regulatory scheme, consideration must be given to the industry subject to regulatory con-
trols. Cable systems occupy a unique position in the communications field. The systems
use coaxial cable or optical fibers to deliver programming to the consumer; no use of
limited airwaves occurs. Yet, cable provides services similar to those provided by conven-
tional over-the-air broadcast systems. As a result, the early court decisions of the 1960's
allowed the FCC to regulate cable as "reasonably ancillary to broadcasting." I. DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 164 (1983).
Gradually, the courts became uneasy with this position. Rather than admit that the
FCC had no jurisdiction over cable, however, the courts overturned specific regulations as
beyond the authority of the FCC. Id. at 163. This approach disregards, in effect, the
FCC's engagement in content regulation of a communication method which could be
entirely unregulated, as are newspapers and other print media. Id at 166; see also Lee,
Cable Franchising and The First Amendment, 36 VAND. L. REV. 867 (1983) (discussing cable
franchising procedures and possible violations of first amendment freedoms).
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defects for which regulation offers a cure."198 Furthermore, regula-
tory tools cannot be used as a method of fine tuning a market or
an industry. At best, regulation can correct "worst cases"; any ef-
fort to extend regulation beyond this basic level will prove fruitless
and perhaps even detrimental to the industry.99
Thus, regulation must be viewed as a "weapon of last resort." °
Once in place, regulatory systems are not easily dismantled,10 1 nor
do they respond quickly to changing conditions in the market-
place.10 2 Regulation may inhibit scientific and technological de-




Given the inherent drawbacks created with any regulatory
scheme and the rapid innovations occurring in the communica-
tions industry, continued governmental control over cable is ineffi-
cient and increasingly undesirable. The trend to deregulate cable
has already begun at the federal level,1°4 and should be pursued at
98. S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 184.
99. Id at 185.
100. Id
101. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 10, at 6-7. Schmalensee points out that regula-
tors are as attached to their jobs as anyone else. Thus, regulators cannot be expected to
recognize or point out the desirability of dismantling the regulatory mechanism. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. See id.; S. BREYER, supra note 17, at 115.
104. S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [herein-
after Senate Bill 66 and House Bill 4103]. These companion bills are intended to amend
the Communications Act of 1934 to deregulate the cable television industry. Senate Bill
66 passed the Senate by an 87-9 vote on June 14, 1983. House Bill 4103 had passed
through the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Fi-
nance but had not yet been considered by the House Energy and Commerce Committee
when Congress adjourned in November 1983.
The cable industry lobbied hard for the passage of this legislation. See NATIONAL
CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY (September 1983)
(industry report urging passage of Senate Bill 66) [hereinafter cited as NCTA NATIONAL
POLICY]. The industry believed it faced a competitive disadvantage when compared to its
unregulated competitors. CONG. Q., 1983 Weekly Report, at 2207.
Specifically, Senate Bill 66 would take a tion in the following three areas: rates,
franchise fees, and franchise renewals. Sctions 607(d)(I)(2) and (3) all provide for rate
deregulation. Section 608(b)(1) would limit maximum franchise fees to five percent of
gross revenues, removing the current restriction of three percent. Finally, section 609(a)
would raise the presumption that a current franchise holder is entitled to renewal of the
franchise.
House Bill 4103 contains several restrictions not contained in Senate Bill 66. The
House Bill would require cable operators to provide leased access to any programmer
desiring access to the cable channels. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 613 (1983). In
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the state level as well. With the rapid technological developments
certain to occur in communications, regulation that attempts to
control monopoly profits may cause more harm than allowing
market forces to govern. Specific recommendations for reducing
regulation in the cable industry fall into three categories: rates,
franchise fees and access requirements, and franchise procedures.
a. Rate Regulation
Rate regulation can impose significant costs on an industry. It
can impose artificially low rates which will serve as a disincentive
for expansion of a system's coverage, dampen incentives for inno-
vation, discourage a system operator from upgrading service to ex-
isting customers, and create cross-subsidization among various rate
classes. 0 5 In addition, if price is regulated, the monopolist has an
incentive to reduce program quality to recapture some of the mo-
nopoly profits restricted by rate regulation.10 6
Ten states had imposed some form of rate regulation on cable
systems by 1979.107 In the majority of these jurisdictions the pub-
lic utility commissions bear primary responsibility for rate regula-
tion. 08 By 1980, three of these states had already decided to
deregulate rates, either in whole or in part. Many municipalities,
however, continue to regulate rates through franchise
agreements. 109
Over the next few years, as competition among new technologies
develops, rate regulation should be eliminated entirely. Several
addition, the House Bill would prevent the owner of a local newspaper or phone company
from owning the cable system in the same community. Id § 614. See Black, House bill seeks
leased access to cable TV, Minneapolis Star & Trib., Oct. 12, 1983, at 5C, col. 1.
105. H. SHOOSHAN, C. JACONS & A. KAHN, CABLE TELEVISION: THE MONOPOLY
MYTH AND COMPETITIVE REALITY 60 (1982).
106. See Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Indust, 3 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 98, 10 (1972).
107. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 39. Those states regulating rates were: Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, and Vermont. Id For a current listing of state cable regulatory statutes, see Don-
aldson, supra note 15, at 418 n.28.
108. Id Local regulatory authorities are already predicting a reduction in local au-
thority to regulate rates. See Gustafson, Cable members seek to squelch cuts in service, Minneap-
olis Star & Trib., Jan. 25, 1984, at 4B, col. 1.
109. Those states deregulating cable rates were Alaska, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 39. New York has recently deregulated rates for smaller
cable companies and California is contemplating similar action. M. HAMBURG, supra note
88, § 304. The cable industry points out that in the 915 cities which have deregulated or
refused to regulate cable rates, the cost of service is essentially the same as in regulated
cities. See NCTA NATIONAL POLICY, supra note 103, at 7.
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states have already taken steps in this direction. °10 Municipalities
should also refrain from rate regulation. Dropping rate regulation
requirements would allow cable companies to price their services
closer to actual cost, and encourage efficiency in providing serv-
ices. Particularly as developing technologies compete directly with
cable for new service areas, cable systems will be forced to price
competitively to capture their share of the market.
b. Franchise Fees and Access Requirements
Franchise fees reduce the value of the franchise to the cable firm
and raise fees paid by subscribers. Although municipal revenues
are generated by these fees, neither subscribers nor cable compa-
nies clearly benefit from them. Essentially, the fees impose a tax
on cable subscribers for the benefit of those who watch the dedi-
cated channels."' This sort of "hidden" tax reduces the accounta-
bility of government. The ratepayer must incur high information
costs to monitor this type of taxation. These costs will greatly re-
duce effective public control of government action. A tax on a
cable company facing an elastic demand curve, may also have al-
locative efficiency effects more adverse than alternative taxation
methods."1
2
The additional burdens placed on cable systems, such as chan-
nel access and public service channels, should be removed. These
responsibilities are not placed upon other competitors in the com-
munications field. Furthermore, these required services force cable
systems to charge higher rates to regular customers, thereby reduc-
ing cable's competitiveness. A tax on all communications competi-
tors could be used to distribute evenly the costs of providing these
special services.' 13 Regardless of the name given to this "commu-
nications" or "amusement" tax, such a tax would significantly re-
duce the additional costs placed on cable companies by access
110. See id.
111. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL. J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 22, 28-29 (197 1).
Generally, the franchise fee corresponds, not to the value of the municipal services, but to
the value of the "governmentally mandated exclusive cable franchise. An artificial mo-
nopoly bestows inflated profit potential upon the franchisee, which in turn profits the
franchisor through the franchise fee. Such an arrangement, however, burdens the pur-
ported beneficiary of government regulation-the subscriber, who pays increased costs."
Hearings on S 66 Before the Subcom. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
& Transportation, 98th Cong., ist Sess. 27 (1983) (statement of Paul I. Bortz, Managing
Partner, Browne, Bortz & Coddington).
112. See Posner, supra note 110, at 38.
113. See G. K. WEBB, supra note 1, at 39, 59-60.
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requirements. The tax would also eliminate the disproportionate
burden placed on cable companies to raise municipal revenues
through franchise fees. Finally, the tax would be visible to the
ratepayer, thus increasing accountability of state and local
governments.
c. Franchise Procedures
In many cases, the franchise agreement involves detailed pro-
gramming, levels of service, public access, and rate regulation pro-
visions. This type of agreement imposes discriminatory obligations
on cable not shared by its competitiors. A principled approach to
the franchise process involves examination of the original reasons
for awarding the franchise.
The natural monopoly characteristics of cable television systems
provide the economic justification for the franchising process.
Awarding a franchise to one firm eliminates the possibility of
wasteful duplication in a local market. Furthermore, if monopoly
profits can be earned in a particular market, awarding a franchise
contract through a competitive bidding process will result in a
capture of the anticipated monopoly profit by the municipality,
leaving the franchisee with a normal profit level.'
1 4
A franchise bidding scheme assumes the existence of a suffi-
ciently large demand for producers so that firms that do not win
the franchise will still be able to bid on renewals. Future bidders
must have the means to remain in existence. If this is not the case,
then significant start-up costs and higher degrees of uncertainty
exist for new bidders than for incumbents, thus substantially dilut-
ing the rigor of the competition."
5
It is critical to keep the focus of the franchise process on the
capture of any monopoly profits that may exist in the market.
This focus suggests that the process should involve bidding by po-
tential cable operators for the franchise to operate a specified sys-
tem.116 The highest dollar bid would be awarded the franchise.
This simplified process would substantially increase public under-
standing of the franchising process as well as increasing the ac-
countability of municipal authorities.
Franchising can be used to capture any monopoly profits which
114. Id at 165.
115. Seeid at 177.
116. For this process to work effectively, bids from nonqualified operators must be
screened out of the bidding.
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may in fact exist in a market. Limiting a franchise to a duration of
roughly ten years can also provide a competitive check on the fran-
chisee. If competing firms can enter and acquire control of a cable
system, franchisees will have incentives to maintain the quality of
their services and to expand and innovate whenever possible." 7
Monopoly power can also be checked if the franchise contract re-
mains nonexclusive. The threat of entry into the market strength-
ens the position of the municipality in seeking compliance with the
contract. Entry threats should also discourage cable operators
from pricing far above competitive levels."" If franchising proce-
dures are intended to control cable's monopoly power, monopoly
power must in fact exist. As developing technologies emerge, any
monopoly power curently held by cable systems will substantially
diminish, and no monopoly profits will remain for the municipal-
ity to capture through the bidding process.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the communications industry continues to innovate at an un-
precedented rate, continuing regulation of cable systems appears
ill-advised.' 1 9 Competing technologies, including conventional tel-
evision, MDS, STV, VCRs, LPTV, DBS, and potential competi-
tion from the telephone industry, significantly reduce the
possibility of monopoly power or profits for a cable system. In
many instances market forces will provide the necessary "regula-
tory tool" to force cable systems to compete actively for the con-
sumer's television viewing time and dollars.
Regulation and its detrimental effects can significantly reduce
the incentives to innovate and operate efficiently. Serious consid-
eration must be given to deregulation of cable enabling it to ac-
tively compete in the communications industry. Regulatory
agencies must reevaluate their roles in this fast-paced, increasingly
competitive field. While deregulation continues as the theme for
117. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies, 7 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 73, 74 (1976).
118. Id at 83-88.
119. Another reason for allowing competition rather than regulation to govern the
cable industry is the potential for corruption in the franchising process. See Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983); Cirace, An Economic Analy-
sis of the State-Municipal Action Antitrust Cases, 61 TEXAS L. REV. 481, 509 (1982); Brown,
From the Air- Programs By Satellite and Cable, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 3, Magazine, at 1,
col. 1; Powerful Groups Clash in Battles to Acquire Cable TV Franchises, N.Y. Times, July 22,
1980, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
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telephone services and other forms of communication, restrictions
on cable systems must be lifted to provide consumers with the wid-
est variety of communications alternatives available at competitive
prices.
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